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The Incompatible Treatment of Majorities
in Election Law and Deliberative Democracy
James A. Gardner

ABSTRACT
Deliberative democracy offers a distinctive and appealing conception of political life, but is it one that
might be called into service to guide actual reform of existing American election law? This possibility
seems remote because American election law and deliberative democracy are built around different priorities and theoretical premises. A foundational area of disagreement lies in the treatment of majorities. Election law is structured, at both the legislative and constitutional levels, so as to privilege majorities and
systematically to magnify their power, whereas deliberative democracy aims at privileging minorities
(or at least de-privileging majorities). The main purpose of the election law now on the books is to narrow
electoral choice; it seeks at every step to exclude views from public conversation in a process of winnowing
out those that command the support only of a minority. Deliberative democracy’s goals and methods, in
contrast, stress at every turn the inclusion of many voices, especially those of minorities and of the socially
and politically excluded. Deliberative democracy’s goal is not to identify a majority entitled to rule, but to
destabilize and transform that majority by exposing its members to opinions and beliefs they do not already
hold. Election law resists such a process. As a result, any attempt to incorporate principles of deliberative
democracy into the design of election law faces serious and deeply entrenched obstacles.
On the other hand, deliberative democracy may well have a valuable role to play by helping to make the
process of public opinion formation outside election campaigns fairer, better informed, and more deliberative. This is in any case where most of the real action takes place: public political opinion is not formed to
any significant degree during the brief season of elections and their formal campaigns—within, that is to
say, the small slice of political life that falls within the domain of election law proper. On the contrary, public political opinion is formed continually, and therefore mainly between elections. Consequently, if the
process of public political opinion formation falls short of deliberative ideals, deliberative democracy
can do the most good by addressing itself to the arena of quotidian, non-electoral politics.
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or a quarter century or more, theories of
deliberative democracy have laid upon the
intellectual table a distinctive and appealing conception of political life. In their emphatic rejection
of economic and minimalist accounts of democracy,
and in their insistence on an ideal of deep and universal political engagement, theories of deliberative
democracy are attractive philosophically. In their
account of democracy as an arena of reasoned,
respectful, and inclusive talk among equals, theories
of deliberative democracy are appealing politically
and sociologically. In their sophisticated affirmation
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of a nearly ubiquitous popular critique holding contemporary political discourse to be coarse, uninformed, and unsatisfying, theories of deliberative
democracy are well attuned to public opinion.
Despite these virtues, however, deliberative
democracy has long been criticized as so unrealistic
in its demands and so utopian in its ideals as to render it essentially useless as a guide to actual reform
in existing political societies.1 This article explores
that critique from the point of view of American
election law by asking whether, and if so how, principles of deliberative democracy might be called
into service to guide reform of the law regulating
elections and campaigns for the purpose of moving it closer to the deliberative ideal. I conclude
that this possibility is remote for a basic reason:
American election law and deliberative democracy
are founded on different priorities, assumptions,
and theoretical premises, and as a result they are
largely incompatible.
The basic problem is simple and foundational:
American election law is structured, at both the
legislative and constitutional levels, so as to privilege majorities and systematically to magnify their
power, whereas deliberative democracy aims at
privileging minorities (or at least de-privileging
majorities). The main purpose of the election law
now on the books in the United States is to narrow
electoral choice—and with it the scope of public
discussion—to a small number of candidates and
ideas that enjoy significant popular support. At
every step, election law seeks to exclude views from
public conversation in a process of winnowing out
those that command the support only of a minority.
In so doing, the opinions and preferences of a majority
acquire at each stage ever more power and significance until the final vote, a mechanism designed to
hand government power to the prevailing majority.
Deliberative democracy’s goals and methods, in
contrast, stress at every turn the inclusion of many
voices, especially those of minorities and of the
socially and politically excluded. Deliberative
democracy cultivates serious, open-minded consideration of and respectful attention to minority
views, and it celebrates the attempt to reach agreement not among the like-minded, no matter how
numerous, but to reach agreement out of diversity,
a diversity that it contends should be carefully and
respectfully nurtured. Deliberative democracy’s
goal is not to identify a majority entitled to rule,
but to destabilize and transform that majority by

exposing its members to opinions and beliefs they
do not already hold.
Because of this stark disjunction, any attempt to
incorporate principles of deliberative democracy
into the design of election law faces serious and
deeply entrenched obstacles. Most obviously, altering the law to operationalize deliberative democracy would require a very substantial degree of
institutional change; indeed, it would require a virtually complete reorientation of legal institutions,
from top to bottom. Moreover, it is far from clear
that reconfiguring electoral laws and institutions
in this way would work an improvement. There
are good reasons for election law to aspire to little
more than taking an accurate snapshot of exogenous
public opinion. In a democratic society of any size,
that by itself is an enormous, difficult, and complex
undertaking. Complicating it by regulating or establishing standards for the quality of public opinion
from which voting proceeds may be more than
any feasible set of electoral institutions can handle.
Nevertheless, deliberative democracy may well
have a valuable role to play, but in a different
way. Even if principles of deliberative democracy
might not readily find a home within the formal
institutional structure of elections and campaigns,
such principles may prove useful in politics by helping to make the process of public opinion formation
outside campaigns fairer, better informed, and more
deliberative. In fact, I shall argue, this is where the
real action takes place because public political opinion is not formed to any significant degree during the
brief season of elections and their formal campaigns—within, that is to say, that portion of political
life that falls within the domain of election law
proper. On the contrary, public political opinion is
formed continually, which is to say mainly between
elections. Consequently, if there are defects in how
public political opinion presently is formed—and I
concur with deliberative democrats that such defects
are legion—then deliberative democracy can do the

1

E.g., Ian Shapiro, Enough of Deliberation: Politics is about
Interests and Power, in Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Stephen Macedo, ed. 1999); Michael
Walzer, Deliberation, and What Else?, in Macedo, supra, at
68; Adam Przeworski, Deliberation and Ideological Domination, in Deliberative Democracy ( Jon Elster, ed. 1998); John
Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, in Nomos
XLII: Designing Democratic Institutions (Ian Shapiro and Stephen Macedo, eds. 2000); James Johnson, Arguing for Deliberation: Some Skeptical Considerations, in Elster, supra.
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most good by addressing itself to the arena of quotidian, non-electoral politics.
At some level, I suspect, proponents of deliberative democracy seem to realize this, for this is
exactly where they have thus far focused most of
their efforts. As scholars and activists have turned
increasingly to the question of how a regime of
deliberative democracy might be implemented in
the real world, their work has largely bypassed elections altogether and tended to focus on ways in
which citizens might deliberatively exert influence
directly on policy decisions made by governments
already in place. This, I think, is the right venue
for deliberative democrats to ply their trade and
the one in which their work can do the most good.
The balance of this article is organized as follows. Part I reviews the basic tenets of deliberative
democracy and describes its thoroughgoing commitment to elevating the role of minorities in democratic politics. Part II considers several of the
major structures of American election law, including the prevailing legal regimes of ballot access,
campaign speech, public financing, and party competition. I argue that, notwithstanding a considerable amount of constitutional rhetoric celebrating
electoral deliberation, these institutions operate
unrelentingly to privilege and to magnify the
power of political majorities, and that they very
likely contribute in practice to the exclusion of
minority views from public electoral discourse.
Part III argues that none of this should worry
deliberative democrats because their work is more
usefully deployed to deal with a much more serious
problem—the problem of majoritarian bias in public opinion formation outside the highly regulated
and artificially constructed arena of formal elections.
Social science research confirms what some deliberative theorists have long maintained: the public opinion formation that really counts occurs every day in
the overwhelmingly non-electoral setting of daily
life and ordinary political experience. It is here that
majoritarian privilege can and should be resisted,
and deliberative democracy has something useful to
say about how that goal might be accomplished.

I. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY’S
PRIVILEGING OF MINORITY VIEWS
Any attempt to characterize deliberative democracy as a theoretical construct must begin with a

frank recognition that pinning down exactly what
it prescribes can at times be frustratingly difficult.
One difficulty is that deliberative democracy contains two major and very different strands of
thought. One strand consists of a strong version
based on a distinctive and highly prescriptive conception of democratic legitimacy. The main tenet
of this strand of thought is that law is legitimately
binding only insofar as it emerges from the deliberatively formed will of all those who will be bound
by it.2 This version has received a good deal of criticism on the ground that it is infeasible on a large
scale because it appears to require both universal
deliberation and consensus, or a strong approach
toward both. A weaker version, fully compatible
with standard conceptions of liberal democracy,
simply advocates more deliberative and better quality public opinion formation.3 The point in this
formulation seems to be the unobjectionable one
that, however a society chooses to structure its democratic processes, it can always benefit from a
democratic public that is better informed, more
open-minded toward and tolerant of dissent, and
more involved in the formulation of public policy.
A second difficulty in attributing particular
beliefs and positions to deliberative democracy is
that, at least from the point of view of interested outsiders, it has been a frustratingly moving target as it
has responded to a series of internal and external
critiques. In particular, the heart of the theory—its
core conception of deliberation—has been modified
frequently, often in ways that make it hard to
distinguish what the theory prescribes from what
existing democratic societies already do. Whereas
originally deliberation was understood to be a very
specific and tightly constrained activity conducted
under demanding ethical rules of intense engagement, respectful listening, sincere open-mindedness,
equality of power, noncoerciveness, non-instrumental

2
Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in Deliberative
Democracy ( Jon Elster, ed. 1998); Dennis Thompson, Just
Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in the United States
191 (2002); John S. Dryzek, Foundations and Frontiers of
Deliberative Governance 3, 21 (2010).
3
James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and
Democracy (expanded ed. 1997); Robert E. Goodin, Reflective
Democracy (2003); Robert E. Goodin, Innovating Democracy:
Democratic Theory and Practice after the Deliberative Turn
(2008); Michael X. Delli Carpini, Fay Lomax Cook, and Lawrence R. Jacobs, Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation,
and Citizen Engagement, 7 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 315 (2004).
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treatment of interlocutors, and so forth, this ideal has
gradually been significantly diluted. Today, it appears
that the concept of deliberation is capacious enough
to include ordinary talk, non-political talk, appeals
to emotion, bargaining, negotiation, power tactics,
the use of coercion, exploitation of inequality, and
even the deployment of such distinctly nondeliberative tactics as heckling and protest.4
Despite this flux, it seems fair to suggest that
deliberative democrats have nevertheless advanced
some relatively stable and consistent requirements
concerning what kind of talk, and in what circumstances, may count as deliberation for purposes of
the theory. In most theories, for example, processes
of deliberation must be inclusive so that deliberators
may consider the greatest variety of viewpoints, a
practice said both to improve the quality of decision
making and to ensure that all who will be bound by
democratic decisions have a voice in making them.5
Deliberation also must occur pursuant to fair procedures that guarantee equality so that deliberations
are not inappropriately dominated by the powerful.6

An especially heavy burden falls on citizens, at
least when they are engaged self-consciously in politics, for theories of deliberative democracy typically require citizens ideally to approach their
deliberations with an almost heroic degree of sincerity, openness, impartiality, tolerance, persistence, and
enthusiasm. Citizens engaged in democratic deliberation must, for example, treat each other with mutual
respect and civility.7 They must work sincerely and
cooperatively toward determining the truth.8 They
must remain open-minded and receptive toward
views and perspectives expressed by others.9 They
must support any argument or position they advance
with reasons, and in justifying their positions must
confine themselves to invoking ‘‘public reasons,’’
meaning reasons that all other reasonable citizens
might in principle accept.10 And they must strive in
deliberation to transcend disagreement by persuading others, rather than attempting to finesse disagreement through strategic bargaining,11 or even worse
by overriding disagreement through raw exercises
of the power of numerical superiority.12 Finally,

4
Jane Mansbridge, Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System, in
Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement,
supra note 1; Robert E. Goodin, Sequencing Deliberative
Moments, 40 Acta Political 182 (2005); Jane Mansbridge,
James Bohman, Simone Chambers, Thomas Christiano, Archon
Fung, John Parkinson, Dennis F. Thompson, and Mark E. Warren, A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy, in Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale
( John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge, eds. 2012); Jane Mansbridge, ‘‘Deliberative Democracy’’ or ‘‘Democratic Deliberation?’’ in Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the
People Govern? (Shawn W. Rosenberg, ed. 2007); Iris Marion
Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 Pol.
Theory, 670 (2001). See also James Bohman, The Coming of
Age of Deliberative Democracy, 6 J. Pol. Phil. 400, 400 (1998)
(‘‘over the last decade, proponents of deliberative democracy
have moved.towards the very institutions they originally
rejected as impossible locations for public reasoning’’).
5
Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to
a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (William Rehg,
trans. 1996); Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990); Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy
(2000).
6
Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 5; Henry S.
Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about
the Ends of Policy (2002); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and
Democratic Legitimacy, in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds. 1989).
7
John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in John
Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999); Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (1996); Richardson,
Democratic Autonomy, supra note 6.
8
David Estlund, Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority, in Deliberative

Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics ( James Bohman
and William Rehg, eds. 1997); Gerald F. Gaus, Reason, Justification, and Consensus: Why Democracy Can’t Have It All, in
Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics,
supra; Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, supra
note 6.
9
Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 5; Gutmann
and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, supra
note 7; Richardson, Democratic Autonomy, supra note 6;
Melissa S. Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation
(1998).
10
Rawls, supra note 7; Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty,
supra note 2; Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in Democracy and Difference: Contesting
the Boundaries of the Political (Seyla Benhabib, ed. 1996);
Thompson, supra note 2, at 191; but see John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations
1–2 (2000). Bohman and Richardson have recently argued for
the abandonment of the concept of reasons that all can accept.
James Bohman and Henry S. Richardson, Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and ‘‘Reasons that All Can Accept,’’ 17 J. Pol.
Phil. 253 (2009).
11
Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech
72 (1993); Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory 117 (1996); Bernard
Manin, The Principles of Representative Government 198–
201 (1997).
12
Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 5; Manin, The
Principles of Representative Government, supra note 11;
Richardson, Democracy Autonomy, supra note 6; Cohen,
Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in The Good Polity:
Normative Analysis of the State (Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit,
eds. 1989).
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throughout the deliberative process, the ideal to
which participants ought to aspire is consensus;13
indeed, the ideal form of consensus is one based
on agreement not merely as to the course of action
to be taken, but as to the underlying reasons for
taking it.14
All of these requirements share a clear purpose:
to de-privilege majorities, and in so doing, to privilege minorities—or perhaps more accurately, to
elevate minorities to a status of rough equality
with majorities, thereby stripping majorities of the
advantages they inherently enjoy in a democratic
society.15 Majorities, after all, are not at risk in
rough-and-tumble or strategically oriented politics;
minorities are. Majorities are not disadvantaged by
closed-mindedness, incivility, uncooperativeness,
power plays, or instrumental bargaining, practices
said to impede fair and productive deliberation;
minorities are the ones who stand to suffer from
these practices. Majorities have little to gain from
deliberation, except perhaps in the thin, Millian
sense of gaining a more vivid realization of the
truth of their positions,16 if they are true. Majorities
benefit not from talk, but from voting, and the
sooner the better.
Majorities, moreover, have little to gain from
deliberation among themselves. There is no compelling reason for people who already agree with
one another to deliberate about their beliefs, and
there are good reasons to fear that deliberation
among the like-minded might actually make things
worse, such as by creating the conditions for a selfconfirming opinion cascade that moves majority opinion to a more extreme version of its pre-deliberation
formulation.17
Finally, majorities certainly have little to gain
from pursuing an aspirational goal of consensus.
Majorities stand to gain from practices that allow
them, as soon as they coalesce, to trade their numerical superiority for control of government institutions. Minorities are the ones who stand to gain
from a consensus requirement, whether binding or
aspirational. Even if such a requirement is not
strong enough to give minorities a veto, it is strong
enough to enable them to demand, and perhaps to
receive, the majority’s attention, and with it the possibility of appealing to and persuading the majority
to a different position—a possibility that, under
deliberative democracy’s rules, is meant to persist
even after the minority has failed to prevent the
majority from coalescing in the first instance.

GARDNER

Clearly, whatever is valuable about deliberation
is realized only, or at least mainly, in one of two circumstances: when there is no majority, or when
majorities deliberate with others who do not share
their views – that is, with minorities. In the first
case, the ground rules of sound democratic deliberation give each minority in principle an equal
chance to persuade other minorities to their view.
In the second case, the rules of deliberation offer
minorities in principle an opportunity to persuade
the majority to change its mind or to modify its
position in a direction favored by the minority.
To a great extent, deliberative democracy’s aversion to majorities is rooted in an unusually strong
principle of equality. Democracy has often been
said to proceed from a presumption of the equality
of persons,18 but in most versions of democracy
simple majority rule is accepted as a decision rule
on the ground that it respects the moral worth of

13

Joshua Cohen, for example, states unequivocally that the purpose of deliberation is ‘‘to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus.’’ Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,
supra note 12, at 23. For Cass Sunstein, consensus is a ‘‘regulative ideal’’ governing the entire process of deliberative democracy. Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 137 (1993). It is
‘‘the gold standard of political justification,.for deliberative
democrats.’’ John S. Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer, Reconciling
Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, 50 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
634, 634 (2006).
14
‘‘In the classic ideal, individuals enter a deliberation with conflicting opinions about what is good for the polity, but after
voicing and hearing the reasons for different opinions, converge
on one option as the best, for the same reasons.’’ Jane Mansbridge with James Bohman, Simone Chambers, David Estlund,
Andreas Follesdal, Archon Fung, Cristina LaFont, Bernard
Manin, and José Luis Martı́, The Place of Self-Interest and
the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy, 64 J. Pol. Phil.
64, 66 (2010); Alfred Moore and Kieran O’Doherty, Deliberative Voting: Operationalizing Consensus in a Deliberative Minipublic, Paper prepared for presentation at APSA Annual
Meeting, August 30–September 2, 2012, at 5–6.
15
Compare Frank I. Michelman, Can the People Ever Make the
Laws? A Critique of Deliberative Democracy, in Deliberative
Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics ( James Bohman
and William Rehg, eds. 1997), at 152 (deliberative democracy
‘‘subordinates any and all pursuit of a social or collective
good to a prior distributive constraint of right, of doing justice
to each taken severally of as many as there are to be considered
of the ‘self-authenticating sources of claims’.that it recognizes’’) (quoting John Rawls, Political Liberalism 32 (1993)).
16
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 97–103 (Penguin ed. 1974) (1st
ed. 1859).
17
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to
Extremes, 110 Yale L.J. 110 (2000).
18
Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics ch. 7 (1989); Fishkin, supra note 3, at 34; William N. Nelson, On Justifying
Democracy 20 (1980); Richardson, supra note 6, at 28.
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each individual by applying a fair and impartial rule
of aggregation.19 Deliberative democracy, though,
goes further. In its strong form, ‘‘free deliberation
among equals is the basis of legitimacy,’’20 and participants do not consider themselves bound by a
legal system ‘‘except insofar as that system establishes the framework of free deliberation among
equals.’’21 As a result, a legitimately binding
expression of popular will cannot be constructed
through the application of an externally derived
decision rule, no matter how impartial and respectful it may be. Instead, equality requires that decisions actually be made by citizens themselves, in
the inherently equality-respecting free play of deliberation, without resort to rules imposed on the deliberative process from outside it. Only in this way can
democratic collective decisions ‘‘trace to the reasoning of the equals who are subject to the decisions.’’22 Indeed, deliberative democrats have long
considered majority rule a form not of decision,
but of coercion, on the ground that it proceeds not
by force of the better reason, but by the force of
the greater number.23
Deliberative democracy, then, aims to strip
majorities of the advantages that, in politics, ordinarily inhere in numbers.24 It throws obstacle after
obstacle in the path lying between majorities and
the exercise of power. Suppose a majority of citizens comes to agreement on some point. May they
now stop thinking about it and turn their attention
to other problems? No; if a minority still wishes
to discuss the matter, the majority must listen to
the minority’s views and reasons.25 May the majority listen with one ear for the sake of politeness
while their minds wander to other topics? No,
they must give their full attention. May they listen
insincerely for the sole purpose of providing the
minority with a superficially respectful hearing?
No, they must remain genuinely open to persuasion
by the force of reason.
Why does deliberative democracy insist on these
demanding protocols? The answer seems to be that
deliberation, for its proponents, offers an enticing
prospect of change; it is capable of providing,
they believe, a destabilizing shock to majoritarian
political opinion, and thus to the status quo. The
prescription for accomplishing this shock is simple:
citizens must work hard to detach themselves intellectually and emotionally from what they already
think they know and believe. In deliberation, all
beliefs must therefore be deemed provisional, and

must be checked and rechecked against any newly
available information and arguments.
This self-detachment, deliberative democrats
seems to believe, is the gate to the citadel of
entrenched majoritarian opinion through which
alternative, minoritarian ideas may just possibly
enter. Thus, according to Henry Richardson, many
deliberative democrats ‘‘would like to see reforms
that more truly realize equality by empowering the
weak and unsettling the status quo.’’26 In a recent
manifesto, a group of nine leading theorists led by
Jane Mansbridge states bluntly: ‘‘Transformations
of preferences, and even on rare occasions

19

Elaine Spitz, Majority Rule xiii, 30 (1984); Jane Mansbridge,
Using Power/Fighting Power: The Polity, in Democracy and
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political 53
(Seyla Benhabib, ed. 1996).
20
Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,
supra note 12, at 21.
21
Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, supra note 2, at 194.
22
Joshua Cohen, Deliberative Democracy, in Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern? 220 (Shawn
W. Rosenberg, ed. 2007). Cohen continues: ‘‘the point of deliberative democracy is to subject the exercise of collective power
to reason’s discipline,.not the advantage of the better situated.’’ Id. He even goes further, arguing that the requirement
of equality in deliberation means that ‘‘those subject to the decisions are treated as equals by the processes of making the decisions, including agenda-setting and preference formation.’’ Id.
Thus, majorities are not entitled to any special consideration
even in setting the ground rules of deliberation.
23
Mansbridge, et al., The Place of Self-Interest, supra note 14,
at 84–86; Przeworski, supra note 1, at 142. On the other hand, it
is sometimes said that even coercive decision rules can be justified in the Rawlsian manner on the grounds that they either
have been, or more commonly could have been, agreed to by
reasonable people in a fair deliberative process. See, e.g.,
Jane Mansbridge, Using Power, supra note 19.
24
In this respect, deliberative democracy’s strong equality
requirement is reminiscent of a tradition in Anglo-American
thought that holds political organization itself to be inherently
suspect, and often shows up in an expressed distaste for political
parties. Nancy L. Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels: An
Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship (2010).
25
It is generally recognized, however, that time pressures may
require a decision before deliberation is complete, or even sufficient. E.g., Robert E. Goodin, Reflective Democracy 167
(2003) (we should ‘‘discuss while we can, vote when we
must’’).
26
Richardson, supra note 6, at 74. See also Andrew Knops,
Delivering Deliberation’s Emancipatory Potential, 34 Political
Theory 594 (2006); Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy, supra note 5, at 6 (deliberative democracy implies inclusion and equality to increase ‘‘the likelihood that democratic
decision-making processes will promote justice’’); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy 29 (1996) (deliberative democracy involves ‘‘the
participation of all citizens in decision making, widely dispersing power in society’’).
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transformations of underlying identities, in the
direction of the common good can be among the
most valuable features of deliberation.’’27 This is a
remarkable contention—that deliberation has the
potential to cause individuals not merely to change
their opinions, but their very identities. Deliberation
is thus the ultimate destabilization agent. It destabilizes the status quo by creating conditions that not
only may unsettle the majority beliefs that undergird it, but at least on some occasions may transform
the underlying identities of the individuals who
comprise the majority so that they become people
who no longer truly desire the status quo.
Deliberative democracy, in sum, is a project fundamentally concerned with destabilizing and transforming settled majorities, and the beliefs to which
they adhere. Its priorities and recommendations
thus aim to undermine the privilege that democratic
processes ordinarily confer on majorities, and to
substitute a set of procedures that give greater
opportunities to minorities to be heard, to influence
public opinion, and to have their ideas compete on
an equal footing, on their merits, for dominance in
the public sphere.

II. ELECTION LAW’S PRIVILEGING
OF MAJORITY OPINION
Things could not be more different in the world
of election law. Many institutions of American
law, without question, have been designed for the
purpose of protecting and privileging political
minorities—separation of powers, federalism,
bicameralism, the Senate, the filibuster, the Electoral College, the bill of rights, and so forth. Election law, however, is not among them. Perhaps
uniquely among major American legal institutions,
the body of law now on the books that structures
and regulates elections and their associated campaigns instead systematically privileges majorities,
magnifies their power, impedes the inclusion of
minority views, and discourages deliberation. Its
purpose is to narrow the range of political disagreement and to tabulate exogenously held public opinion for the purpose of identifying a majority that is
entitled to rule. These strategies are deeply woven
into the fabric of the enterprise.28
To be sure, one would never know this from the
way the U.S. Supreme Court talks about election
law. A rhetorical commitment to the importance

of persuasion and deliberation in electoral campaigns thoroughly suffuses our legal institutions.
The Court has explicitly elevated the process of persuasion in election campaigns to the status of constitutional doctrine: ‘‘The primary goal of all
candidates,’’ the Court has held, ‘‘is to carry on a
successful campaign by communicating to the voters persuasive reasons for electing them.’’29 ‘‘Competition in ideas and governmental policies,’’ says
the Court, ‘‘is at the core of our electoral process
and of the First Amendment freedoms.’’30 For that
reason, ‘‘the First Amendment.has its fullest and
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political office.’’31
On the face of it, this kind of emphatic commitment to free and open political expression suggests
a constitutional regime of electoral politics that
accords a central role in election campaigns to
deliberation. Election campaigns, however, do not
take place in the abstract world described by
broad, cross-cutting constitutional principles; they
take place in the real world of concrete legal and
political institutions. An examination of the legal
regimes shaping our actual electoral institutions
reveals that they operate on a set of very different
principles. In particular, much of the constitutional
architecture structuring the electoral process is
based not on a robust commitment to electoral
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Mansbridge, et al., The Place of Self-Interest, supra note 14,
at 79; see also Susan C. Stokes, Pathologies of Deliberation, in
Elster, supra note 1, at 134 (‘‘Public communication may
change not only preferences but indeed identity’’).
28
The same, I hasten to add, cannot necessarily be said of the
election law of other nations. Elsewhere, devices such as proportional representation, low electoral thresholds, representational quota systems, and the like, may function to give
minorities a much more significant role than they are afforded
under American election law, which remains in many respects
an outlier.
29
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 101 (1976) (per curiam).
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Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
31
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971). This
conception is also present in judicial theories based, for example, on the ideology of the marketplace of ideas, which presupposes a meaningful competition among political ideas in which
citizens choose among those ideas on the basis of their persuasiveness. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke Law Journal 1; David A.
Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression,
91 Colum L. Rev. 334 (1991). It is equally present in the theory
of the First Amendment, long associated with the philosopher
Alexander Meiklejohn, that the primary purpose of free speech
is to enable citizens of a democracy to govern themselves intelligently. Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to
Self-Government (1948).
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deliberation, but on its opposite—on the premise
that very little of what we might think of as deliberation is to be expected in the electoral process. I
shall illustrate this proposition by reference to four
constitutional regimes that contribute significantly
to the structure of contemporary American electoral
politics: the rules by which candidates may earn a
place on the ballot; the constitutional treatment of
laws regulating the giving and spending of money
in election campaigns; the federal system of public
financing of presidential elections; and the associational rights of political parties.

and many points of view compete for public approval, but rather to narrow the scope of campaign discourse by restricting ballot access to candidates who
support positions that already command substantial
support among the electorate before the campaign
has even begun.
Today, most states regulate ballot access according to a simple principle: parties and candidates
that, prior to campaigning for office, can demonstrate substantial existing support among the electorate are permitted a place on the ballot; parties
and candidates that cannot demonstrate such support are excluded. Consider, for example, Connecticut’s not atypical scheme of ballot access. Like
many states, Connecticut distinguishes between a
‘‘major party’’ and a ‘‘minor party.’’ A ‘‘major
party’’ is any party whose candidate for governor
at the last gubernatorial election polled at least
twenty percent of the total votes cast, or whose
members comprise at least twenty percent of the
total number of voters who have registered as members of a political party.36 A ‘‘minor party’’ is any
party whose candidate ‘‘for the office in question’’
received at least one percent of the total votes
cast.37 Under the statute, candidates nominated by
parties that have qualified as major or minor are
listed automatically on the ballot.38 In contrast, candidates of parties that were not sufficiently popular
at the most recent election to qualify as ‘‘minor,’’
and candidates wishing to run as independents,
must make a showing of current support by filing
nominating petitions containing signatures equal
to one percent of the number of votes cast at the preceding election for the office for which they are running, or 7,500, whichever is less.39 Connecticut’s

Ballot access
An election ballot is in a sense just a piece of
paper, yet laws regulating the production of the ballot are among the most significant in an electoral
democracy. Although such laws do not on their
face purport to regulate much more than the terms
upon which candidates may have their names printed
on the ballot, in practice they exert an extremely
powerful influence on the course of election campaigns. Most obviously, laws regulating access to
the official ballot play a crucial gatekeeping role by
establishing the conditions under which potential
candidates for public office may become actual candidates. Although nothing in principle prevents candidates who are not listed on the ballot from waging a
kind of rump campaign aimed at drawing attention to
themselves or the issues they advocate, a candidacy
unconnected to a place on the ballot is a severely disadvantaged one that is unlikely to serve, in the
Court’s words, as ‘‘an effective platform for the
expression of views on the issues of the day’’32 and
a ‘‘rallying point for like-minded citizens.’’33
If the goal of election law were to encourage the
widest range of campaign deliberation, we might
expect it, under constitutional compulsion, to take
an inclusive approach that affords all views, and
the candidates who advocate them, easy and generous access to the ballot. After all, the Court has
noted, even losing candidacies have ‘‘contributed
to [the public’s] understanding of the issues;’’34
‘‘Abolitionists, Progressives, and Populists have
undeniably had influence, if not always electoral
success.’’35 In fact, however, state ballot access
laws have, with the Court’s approval, generally
taken precisely the opposite approach. The main
concern of today’s ballot access laws typically is
not to create a campaign in which many candidates
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Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
Id. See also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 101 (‘‘qualifying for the ballot [is] a step that, with rare exceptions, is essential to successful
effort’’).
34
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 798.
35
Illinois State Board of Elections, 440 U.S. at 185–86. See also
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 200 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (‘‘The minor party’s often unconventional positions broaden political debate, expand the range of
issues with which the electorate is concerned, and influence
the positions of the majority, in some instances ultimately
becoming majority positions’’).
36
Conn. Gen. Stat. x 9-372(5).
37
Id., x 9-372(6).
38
Id., x 9-379.
39
Id., x 9-453d. Candidates nominated by major and minor parties are precluded from qualifying for the ballot by nominating
petition. Id., x 9-453t.
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scheme thus makes ballot access contingent upon a
showing of electoral support well before the commencement of the official campaign.40 In the case
of major and minor party candidates, support is simply presumed on the basis of recent electoral performance. All other candidates must show substantial
support by producing signed nominating petitions
before being admitted to the ballot.
The burden of these ballot access requirements
on third party and independent candidates should
not be underestimated. To obtain signatures of
even one percent of the electorate for statewide
office can require, in large states, a heroic effort.
In Florida, for example, until 1998 third party and
independent candidates for governor had to obtain
nearly two hundred thousand signatures, a burden
no candidate ever successfully carried.41 Nominating signatures, moreover, are costly to obtain. Commercial signature-collection firms routinely charge
more than one dollar per signature,42 meaning that
small-party or independent candidates might conceivably exhaust a good portion of their campaign
resources merely qualifying for the right to run, if
indeed they have the resources to qualify at all.
The effect of these kinds of ballot access schemes
is of course to make it extremely unlikely that any
views will be presented to the electorate during
the campaign that do not, prior to the campaign,
already enjoy significant public support. The typical
ballot access regime thus serves not as an initial
move in a campaign-endogenous process of open
debate by diverse candidates and their supporters,
but as a first-pass method of narrowing the scope
of discussion to those ideas that are already widely
held.
Given the Court’s strong rhetorical commitment
to open ballot access as a means of encouraging
campaign-endogenous opinion formation, one
might expect the Court to take a dim view of
these kinds of restrictions. It has not. To the contrary, the Court has never invalidated a ballot access
restriction solely on the ground that it required an
excessive showing of pre-campaign support.43 In
fact, the Court has enthusiastically endorsed state
ballot access laws that restrict ballot positions to
candidates who are able to show a significant
level of exogenous pre-campaign public support.
The Court has been quite clear on this point: to
admit to the ballot candidates who do not begin
the campaign enjoying ‘‘a significant modicum’’
of public support would be to tolerate a kind of
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‘‘ballot.clutter[]’’44 or ‘‘clogging of [the] election
machinery’’ that would court ‘‘voter confusion’’ at
best,45 and would at worst open the door to ‘‘unrestrained factionalism’’46 and even ‘‘chaos.’’47
Indeed, the Court has gone further: routine ballot
access restrictions are constitutional because ‘‘a
State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the
integrity of its political processes from frivolous
or fraudulent candidacies.’’48 Candidates, then,
who enter campaigns hoping actually to persuade
voters to a position that they do not in large numbers
already hold before the campaign begins therefore
do not display the ‘‘seriousness’’ necessary to justify
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Nominating petitions must be filed no later than ninety days
before election day. Id., x 9-453i. See also id. x 9-423(a) (establishing second Tuesday in August as last date for party primary
elections).
41
Richard Winger, Ballot Access: A Formidable Barrier to Fair
Participation, May 17, 2005, < http://www.ballot-access.org/
winger/fbfp.html > . Florida substantially eased this requirement in 1998 after an initiative amendment to the Florida Constitution required equality of candidate ballot access. Richard
Winger, How Many Parties Ought to Be on the Ballot?: An
Analysis of Nader v. Keith, 5 Election L.J. 170, 177 n.55.
(2006).
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In California initiative drives, the present going rate appears
to be between one and two dollars per signature, e.g., John Marelius and Ed Mendel, ‘‘Governor’s Backers, Foes Scramble to
Make Ballot,’’ San Diego Union-Tribune, Mar. 28, 2005, A-1
(reporting going rate of $1 to $1.50 per signature), but considerably higher figures have often been reported. See, e.g., Robert
Salladay, Game of the Name Is Profit, Los Angeles Times, Apr.
20, 2005, B-1 (reporting expenditures of $1 to $2 per signature);
John M. Hubbell and Lynda Gledhill, Petition Circulators
Cleaning Up, San Francisco Chronicle, March 24, 2004, B3
($3 to $3.50 per signature); George Skelton, Gov.’s Performance in Role of ‘‘Reformer’’ Seems a Little Strained, Los
Angeles Times, March 14, 2005, B-3 (up to $10 per signature).
43
See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (upholding Georgia ballot access requirement that independents collect signatures equal to five percent of the total number of voters
eligible to vote at the last election); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974) (upholding California ballot access requirement
that independent candidates collect signatures equaling five
percent of total votes cast in the preceding election, during a
24-day period, exclusively from registered voters who vote in
a party primary); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S.
767 (1974) (upholding Texas ballot access scheme imposing
successively more onerous requirements on major parties,
minor parties, non-minor parties, and independents); Munro v.
Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (upholding ballot
access requirement that minor party candidates receive at least
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Munro, 479 U.S. at 196.
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Storer, 415 U.S. at 736.
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Id. at 730.
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a place on the ballot;49 they are ‘‘spurious candidates’’ whom the state is justified in ‘‘weeding
out.’’50
The Court’s decisions in these cases expose an
interesting paradox. In deciding ballot access
cases, the Court relies primarily on constitutional
principles of equal protection and free speech, principles generally understood to exist for the benefit
of minorities, not majorities.51 How can constitutional commitments that benefit minorities be
deployed so as to validate the conferral of advantages on a majority? The answer appears to be
that rights are just as available to majorities as to
minorities, and when majorities are capable of
benefitting from the invocation of a right they can
sometimes use it more powerfully and to greater
effect than minorities.52 An important difference
between deliberative democracy and a rightsbased constitutional regime is that the former is
structured so as to provide rights that can be used
only and exclusively by minorities—the right to
be heard, the right to command attention and
respect, and so forth. But in the legal system generally, the invocation of rights cannot easily be
restricted to their intended beneficiaries.

speech, such laws must satisfy the most demanding
degree of judicial scrutiny, one that requires the
government to demonstrate that the law is supported
by a ‘‘‘compelling state interest, and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’’’55 Even laws
that regulate only the time, place, and manner of
political speech, rather than its content, face an elevated degree of judicial scrutiny.56
On its face, robust constitutional protection for
the freedom of campaign speech is consistent with
a deliberative politics, and in its campaign finance
cases the Court has stressed the Constitution’s commitment to ‘‘[d]iscussion of public issues and debate
on the qualifications of candidates.’’57 The difficulty, however, is that in its pursuit of a largely
unregulated arena of free campaign debate, the
Court has taken constitutional rules protecting
speech and applied them with equal force to the protection of expenditures of money used to purchase
and disseminate speech.58

Campaign finance and the First Amendment
privilege for widely held ideas
Because most public political speech in the
United States is generated privately and disseminated with privately held resources, the institution
of campaign speech is built on, and inevitably reproduces, underlying inequalities in the distribution of
resources, biasing it in favor of the rich.53 What is
less obvious is that the governing constitutional
regime also has a distinctly majoritarian bias. In
particular, the existing constitutional rules favor
the harvesting of private financial resources in a
way that consistently advantages front-running
beliefs and opinions, which is to say, the opinions
of majorities. By the same token, constitutional
speech rules subject the opinions of minorities to
serious and cumulating disadvantages as an election
campaign proceeds.
The First Amendment, the Court has consistently
maintained, ‘‘has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office,’’54 and laws restricting or regulating
campaign speech are therefore severely disfavored.
When regulation is based on the content of the

49
Lubin, 415 U.S. at 715; see also id. at 718 (producing signed
petitions is a way for a candidate to ‘‘demonstrate the ‘seriousness’ of his candidacy’’).
50
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 146. The Court used virtually identical
reasoning in upholding the decision of a public television station to exclude from a televised campaign debate among candidates for Congress all but the major party candidates. Arkansas
Educational Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666
(1998).
51
Generally speaking, the purpose of all individual rights is to
protect individuals and minorities from majoritarian tyranny.
The locus classicus of this view is probably Footnote 4 of Carolene Products, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
52
This may help explain why majorities that deploy rights in
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minorities—the hated rich, for example, or people holding ‘‘unpopular’’ views, a claim that often seems in fact to mean ‘‘unpopular with vocal liberal minorities.’’
53
See, e.g., Jacob Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted (2010).
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Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
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Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992), quoting Perry
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(1983).
56
The pertinent legal test can vary with the circumstances, but is
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which requires a ‘‘substantial relation’’ between the law and
some ‘‘‘sufficiently important’ government interest.’’ Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–367 (2010), quoting Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 66 (1976) (per curiam).
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Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam). See
also, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986) (the First Amendment
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political arena is truly competition among ideas’’).
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Under the constitutional rules crafted by the
Court, direct spending to promote ideas or candidates cannot be restricted.59 The reason, the Court
has explained, is that ‘‘[a] restriction on the amount
of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience
reached’’;60 such limits, that is, impair the quality
of campaign deliberation. Contribution limitations,
in contrast, are permitted for two reasons. First,
the speaker’s interest in contributions is less because
contributions communicate only a limited message, namely one of support: ‘‘[t]he quantity of
communication by the contributor does not
increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.’’61
Second, this relatively slight diminution in the
quantity of electoral speech is justified by the government’s interest in ‘‘limit[ing] the actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions.’’62
This jurisprudence of campaign finance, then, is
built around two fundamental assumptions. The
first assumption is that a candidate’s expenditure
of money during an election campaign translates
into votes. The assumed relationship is certainly
rough, but it is also roughly linear: the more candidates spend, the more votes they are likely to get.63
It is this assumption that drives the Court’s doctrinal commitment to the principle that campaign
spending by candidates for elective office, or
their supporters, cannot in any circumstances be
limited.
The second assumption driving the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence is that a candidate’s receipt of money during an election campaign reflects
support for that candidate, and that this support indicates to some degree endorsement by contributors
of the candidate’s ideological and policy positions.
As the Court has put it, ‘‘[a] contribution serves as
a general expression of support for the candidate
and his views.’’64 As with spending, the relation
between contributions and support is assumed to
be rough, but also linear: the more support candidates enjoy among the electorate the more contributions they will receive, and the more contributions
they receive the more widespread we may assume
their support to be.
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These two assumptions—that campaign spending is correlated to votes and that campaign contributions are correlated to support—together
presuppose, and work to institutionalize, a system
of electoral politics in which election campaigns
are unlikely to serve as occasions for the deliberative contemplation of minority opinion. Instead,
election campaigns are much more likely to function in a way that simply identifies, and transforms
into political authorization, the opinions that a
majority of voters hold at the inception of the
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Yale L.J. 1001, 1004 (1976); Attorney General of Canada v.
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the members of Congress who enacted the Federal Election
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campaign. In this system, political ideas that are the
most popular and widely held before the campaign
starts, and the candidates who espouse them, will
begin with an enormous advantage—the pole position, so to speak.
Here is how it works. If money enables candidates to deliver campaign speech, then any contribution received by a candidate before or shortly after
the inception of the official campaign must by definition be donated on the basis of a point of view
that has been formulated before the commencement
of the campaign. It follows that candidates who
enter the campaign supporting positions that are
the most popular before the campaign begins will
have an initial advantage. At or before the campaign’s inception, they will attract more donations
than their opponents. They will then use this
money to communicate ideas that already enjoy
widespread support among the electorate. Such
ideas will likely appeal to more voters than competing, less popular ideas advanced by other candidates, an effect that may be expected to elicit
further rounds of financial contributions from likeminded supporters. This additional support will
multiply the initial advantage these candidates
already enjoy by allowing them to communicate
their message more broadly and intensely. These
further rounds of communication then produce further rounds of contributions, producing additional
communication, and so on.65
On its own assumptions, then, the campaign
finance system constituted by the Court’s decisions is likely to operate more as a vehicle for
flushing out and ratifying majority opinion than
as a vehicle for the formulation of public opinion
through reflection and deliberation during the
campaign. Any candidate who attempts to promote minority political ideas through a process
of exposure and debate during the campaign
itself will start off at a great, and possibly insurmountable, disadvantage. The system is thus
well-designed to identify and cumulatively build
support for views already held by a majority, but
poorly designed to promote open-minded deliberation and serious encounters, on an equal footing,
between majority and minority views. Rather, the
way in which money enters the system operates to
replicate and reify financially the distribution of
pre-campaign opinion among the electorate, and
to hand to majorities the tools to solidify their
front-running positions.66
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Public financing of election campaigns
It is often argued that public financing of elections offers a possible cure for the biases that inhere
in the private financing of campaigns in a society
characterized by inequality in the distribution of private resources.67 In the United States, that potential
has gone unfulfilled. On the contrary, the structure
of federal public financing law actually enhances
the majoritarian bias of public opinion formation
during campaigns by providing an extra boost to
candidacies supported by political majorities.
In a series of statutes stretching back to 1966,
Congress has provided for public financing of presidential election campaigns.68 The present statutory
scheme of public financing and the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in upholding it bear striking similarities
to the ballot access laws and cases described
above. Under the law, candidates for president
may receive public financing in amounts that differ
depending upon the pre-campaign popularity of the
political party of which the candidate is the nominee. For purposes of funding, a ‘‘major party’’ is
one whose presidential candidate received at least
twenty-five percent of the vote in the preceding
presidential election;69 a ‘‘minor party’’ is a party
whose presidential candidate received between
five and twenty-five percent of the vote in the last
65
Michael, J. Malbin, A Public Funding System in Jeopardy:
Lessons from the Presidential Nomination Contest of 2004, 5
Election L. J. 2 (2006), argues that this phenomenon is made
even worse by the front-loading of presidential primaries,
which requires candidates to raise money extremely early in
the campaign to have any chance of gaining the kind of public
exposure and attention necessary to mount a successful campaign.
66
This conclusion clearly holds for contributions to candidates,
which are capped. A different spending mechanism—independent spending and post-Citizens United contributions to independent-expenditure political action committees (PACs)—
obviously opens a different prospect: the possibility that rich
minorities will spend amounts far disproportionate to their
numbers. Nevertheless, the point I am making concerns the
structure and design premises of legal institutions, and even
the Court surely would have to concede that this possibility is
a perversion, not a fulfillment, of the legal structure of the institution of independent expenditures.
67
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presidential election;70 and a ‘‘new party’’ is any
other political party.71
Under the statute, candidates nominated by a
major party are eligible to receive for the general
election the full amount of public funds to which
the law entitles them.72 Minor party candidates,
however, are not entitled to the full amount of public
funds made available to candidates of the major parties; they are entitled instead only to a proportion of
that amount corresponding to the ratio by which
their party’s candidate in the previous presidential
election fell short of the average number of votes
earned in that election by the candidates of the
major parties.73 Candidates of new political parties
get no public financing up front, but are entitled to a
post-election disbursement of public funds in proportion to the number of votes they actually receive,
provided they receive at least five percent of the
total popular presidential vote.74 Candidates who
run as independents, without the backing of any
political party, even a new one, may not receive
public financing.75
Under this scheme, then, public campaign funds
are allocated on the basis of a candidate’s estimated
pre-campaign support, creating a significant bias in
favor of candidates who support positions that are
widely held before the campaign commences.
Although the federal public financing scheme is
thus similar to the typical ballot access law, in
which ballot access becomes easier as a candidate’s
estimated pre-campaign support increases, candidates for president who support less popular views
suffer under this scheme from multiple disadvantages. First, because their views are not already
widely held before the campaign begins, they
must advance their positions through actual campaign-endogenous persuasion, requiring them to
work harder during the campaign to earn votes. Second, again because their views are not exogenously
popular, they have greater difficulty securing public
funding for their election campaigns. Third, because
they will have fewer resources at the outset of the
campaign than candidates who enter it supporting
exogenously popular views, they will be unable to
keep pace with their competitors’ spending, a disadvantage that will likely cause them to fall even further behind in appealing successfully for votes. In
short, the bias under this financing system in favor
of exogenously popular political opinion is severe.
The Supreme Court has had no difficulty sustaining this method of public financing. As in the ballot
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access area, the Court has identified the campaignendogenous formation of public opinion through
deliberation as the central value of concern: ‘‘Subtitle H [the public financing provision] is a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor
speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate
and enlarge public discussion and participation in
the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing
people.’’76 Nevertheless, the Court dismissed challenges to the financing scheme’s differential treatment of major and minor party candidates in
terms similar to those it has employed in the ballot
access arena: ‘‘Congress’ [sic] interest in not funding hopeless candidacies with large sums of public
money.necessarily justifies the withholding of
public assistance from candidates without significant public support.’’77
Party competition and association
Every state by law has structured electoral competition in a way that steers it into the form of party
competition. Parties enjoy numerous privileges not
just of law, such as rights of ballot access and
recruitment and registration of members and candidates, but of constitutionally protected association.
The nature of party competition, however, tends to
steer electoral discourse into patterns that discourage meaningful deliberation and to privilege views
already held by large and dominant groups of the
like-minded.
The principal constitutional protection for parties
lies in the First Amendment right of expressive
association,78 a right derived from the first-order
70

Id., x 9002(7).
Id., x 9002(8).
72
Id., x 9004(a)(1). In 2012, this amount was $91.2 million,
< http://fec.gov/ans/answers_public_funding.shtml#howmuchmoneydotheyget > , though neither major-party candidate chose
to accept public funding.
73
26 U.S.C. x 9004(a)(2)(A).
74
Id., x 9004(a)(3).
75
Given the possibility of some reimbursement for new party
candidates under x 9004(a)(3), functionally independent candidates have a strong financial incentive to organize a new party
as a vehicle for their independent run.
76
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92–93.
77
Id. at 96.
78
The right to expressive association is distinct from what the
Court has called the right of intimate association. The latter is
based not on the First Amendment, but on conceptions of personal autonomy in the choice of friends and intimate associates
that are rooted in substantive due process. See Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–19 (1984).
71

INCOMPATIBLE TREATMENT OF MAJORITIES

481

right to speak on the ground that ‘‘[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association.’’79 A political
party, in the Court’s view, is a paradigm of an
expressive association,80 and the Court has invoked
the right of association on numerous occasions to
invalidate government regulations to which parties
have objected.81
The main benefit that parties derive from the
right to expressive association is the ability to control the content of their public communications.
As speakers, parties enjoy the same freedom from
censorship and content regulation that individuals
possess directly under the First Amendment’s firstorder protection for freedom of speech.82 The second-order right of expressive association, however,
provides parties with the ability to control the content of their speech in another way: by controlling
their membership.83 Thus, parties not only can
decide who is entitled to be a member, but also
can decide, even over the objection of the state,
who is eligible to participate in the party’s selection
of its candidates.84 On this view, a party must be
able to control its membership in order effectively
to control its speech because the presence within
an organization of individuals who do not share a
commitment to its goals and positions can contradict or undermine the organization’s message.85
Party competition is often supposed to be an
institution that promotes deliberative decision making among the electorate. General elections, on this
view, may serve as occasions for the deliberative
exchange by parties of opposing points of view.
Within parties, primary elections may function as
vehicles for intra-party deliberation during which
party members may be exposed to positions that
are minority views even within their own party.
Yet, although these possibilities exist, the structure
of actual constitutional rules tends to discourage
political deliberation by and within parties in
numerous ways.
First, under the existing rules, the basis for constitutional protection of party membership is not
its propensity to promote deliberation, but its quality as an act of ideological affiliation. The act of
joining a party is thus pushed into a pattern not
of deliberative engagement with the party’s membership, but of an ideological endorsement of the
party’s preexisting positions, based on their congeniality to the pre-affiliation views of the new mem-

ber. As a result, parties grow not by persuading the
undecided, but by accreting the like-minded. Moreover, because under state law voter registrations are
generally fixed until altered by a later affirmative
act of the voter, the law invites voters to view the
act of partisan affiliation not as a form of ongoing
deliberative engagement with fellow partisans, but
as a rare event that occurs only once, at the inception of a citizen’s political life, a practice that
seems to discourage, or at least fails to encourage,
regular reflection on political commitments.
Second, the constitutional right of party association gives parties the authority to exclude people of
different views from the party. This reduces the possibility that minority opinions might gain a foothold
within a party, and squelches the potential for internal deliberation based on a diversity of viewpoints.
Thus, the range of views accessible to party members even were they inclined to deliberate, is artificially restricted to those with whom party members
are likely already to agree; certainly this will be the
case for the major, most politically salient issues,
the very ones that are most likely to entice voters
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to affiliate ideologically with a party in the first
instance.
Finally, whatever their dispositions regarding
internal deliberation and debate, parties have little
incentive to adopt deliberative tactics or to engage
minority views in their external communications.
Given the brief period of a campaign, a party’s main
incentive is to mobilize its membership, something
done by appealing to majoritarian, campaignexogenous beliefs, not through challenging ideological engagement. Furthermore, were parties to
invite deliberation with non-members, their targets
would necessarily consist mainly of members of
other parties. But like members of the speaking
party, members of the audience party also have previously made a standing decision to affiliate ideologically with their party; they have committed
themselves, in other words, to an opposing set of
views, and consume intraparty communication
within the cocoon of a cadre of the like-minded.86
All this has a tendency to push party competition
into the format of a sorting mechanism the main
function of which is to match voters with candidates
based on exogenously held beliefs.
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advocated by theories of deliberative democracy
(whatever they might be) would constitute an
improvement. There is a reason why election law
takes its current form: it performs the difficult and
indispensable task of taking an accurate snapshot
of public opinion at a particular moment. In fact,
the kinds of issues that election law now struggles
with most arduously are to a considerable extent
related to the accuracy of the snapshot—voter identification, registration purges, partisan administration of electoral laws, and so forth. Just getting an
accurate count turns out to be such an enormously
difficult and socially contentious task that it is
hard to think of minority- and deliberation-friendly
reform as within the realm of the possible.

III. A ROLE FOR DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY IN NON-ELECTORAL
POLITICS
If, as I have argued, the goals and methods of
deliberative democracy and election law differ so
fundamentally, are theories of deliberative democracy capable of offering any practical guidance for

A more minority-friendly election law?
As the foregoing review makes clear, election
law proceeds from a very different set of premises
than deliberative democracy. At virtually every
step of the formal process—from securing a spot
on the official ballot, through the campaign phase,
to Election Day voting—the relevant law progressively narrows the field of choice, providing cumulative advantages to views and candidates backed by
a majority, and imposing corresponding disadvantages on opinions and candidates preferred by
minorities. The very telos of American election
law is not to provide an opportunity for minorities
to influence majority opinion, but quite the opposite: to identify as quickly and as accurately as possible the pre-election views of the majority, and to
clear a path for that majority to assume the reins
of power.87 For this reason alone, it is difficult to
see how election law could accommodate the principal concerns of deliberative democracy without
undergoing a thorough, disruptive, and highly
improbable transformation.88
Moreover, it is not at all clear that the kinds
of modifications to election law that would be necessary to afford minorities the kind of treatment
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reforming the legal regime now structuring American political life? The answer, I think, is almost certainly yes, but the guidance is best directed to
venues other than the formal electoral system. Without a doubt, elections and their associated campaigns furnish dramatic and engaging focal points
to democratic politics—elections, after all, provide
those theatrical moments when public opinion is
transformed into power, and in which the great democratic drama of the peaceful handing over of power
is actually performed. Yet it is a profound mistake
reductively to equate politics and elections. In truth,
elections constitute only a small piece of the fabric
of democratic life. If deliberative democracy teaches
us anything, it is that most of what counts as democratic politics occurs on a daily basis, in ordinary
political life, outside the unusual and strangely ritualized sphere of the formally electoral. It is here, I want
to suggest, in politics rather than in elections, that
theories of deliberative democracy offer the prospect
of greater traction, and where their commitment to
the hearing of minority views offers the best opportunity to frame and guide genuinely useful change.

contributing to this disaggregated process of public
will-formation sometimes mention political parties,
social movements, local neighborhoods, the workplace, coffeehouses, newspapers, and radio call-in
shows.92 With the exception of political parties,
none of these is linked in any formal way to electoral
processes, and all can be expected to perform any
functions that contribute to formation of the public
will continuously, regardless of election cycles.
Similarly, deliberative democracy theorists typically deemphasize the role of elections in disciplining elected officials by envisioning mechanisms
that steer elected officials toward compliance with
the public will as they go about their business—by
definition, between elections. Gutmann and
Thompson, for example, approach the problem by
expanding the traditional notion of what counts as
legislative representation. ‘‘Deliberative democracy,’’ they contend, ‘‘does not specify a single form
of representation. It searches for modes of representation that support the give-and-take of serious and
sustained moral argument within legislative bodies,
between legislators and the citizens, and among citizens themselves.’’93 Gutmann and Thompson thus
understand deliberative democracy to require ‘‘an
ongoing process. Deliberation continues through
stages, as officials present their proposals, citizens
respond, officials revise, citizens react, and the
stages recur,’’ a process they call ‘‘the reiteration
of deliberation.’’94
An election, on this view, is merely one point—
and a not very significant point, at that—in an ongoing conversation between and among the public and
elected officials about what ought to be done. The

Deliberative democracy as a theory of politics,
not elections
Deliberative democracy has little to say to election law because, unlike, say, theories of democratic
representation, it is at bottom not a theory of elections but a theory of politics. Deliberative democracy concerns itself predominantly with the
formation of the public will, but most deliberative
theorists tend to acknowledge that the democratically relevant deliberative public will is not formulated suddenly, in any single event such as an
election campaign, but through a slow, decentralized, disaggregated process that occurs in many places at many times.
Habermas’s well-known model, for example,
contemplates a two-stage process89 in which the
deep, legitimating public will takes shape in ‘‘an
open and inclusive network of overlapping, subcultural publics having fluid temporal, social, and substantive boundaries [that] together.form a ‘wild’
complex that resists organization as a whole.’’90
Only after its formulation in this chaotic arena
does the public will eventually make its way into
the formal setting of institutionalized democratic
politics.91 Theorists who have considered more specifically what kinds of institutions are capable of
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more important moments in this conversation occur
not so much when candidates propose themselves for
office as when officials propose specific policies and
actions for actual implementation. These proposals
then serve, much more efficiently and precisely
than do election campaigns, to focus public attention
and discussion on exactly what deliberative democracy conceives to be the really important question
for public deliberation: what ought we to do? The
public will, then, guides the legislative will mainly
through ongoing policy consultation, not through
episodic electoral disciplining.
The low relevance of elections and electoral campaigns to theories of deliberative democracy is
nowhere more vividly revealed than in the work of
those who focus on the practical implementation
of deliberative democracy. Some scholars and activists have begun to turn increasingly to the question
of how a regime of deliberative democracy might
be implemented in the real world. This work typically ignores election campaigns as a potential
forum for thick deliberation, bypassing them altogether in favor of emphasizing ways in which citizens might deliberatively exert direct influence on
policy decisions made by governments that have
already, so to speak, been installed.95 When those
who work at implementing deliberative democracy
talk enthusiastically about successful models, they
talk about participatory budgeting in Porte Alegre,
Brazil, or deliberative urban planning in Perth, Australia;96 they rarely talk about enhancing the deliberative quality of electoral campaigns.97 In sum, then,
theories of deliberative democracy generally hold
that the kind of deliberation necessary to legitimate
state power occurs mainly outside of electoral institutions, in an informal public sphere rather than within
the formal institutions of the electoral process.
The stability of majority opinion
during election campaigns
I argued in Part II that the formal electoral arena
provides an inhospitable environment for deliberative democracy because its institutions are founded
on incompatible principles and assumptions. But
there is another reason why the electoral arena is
inhospitable to the goals of deliberative democracy:
it is an environment hostile to the destabilization
of majority political opinion. In fact, a wealth of
social science research demonstrates that majority
political opinion is extremely stable during election
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campaigns, and is therefore unlikely to be altered
during that brief period by exposure to contrary
views. If anything, election campaigns are more
likely to ratify and reinforce majority opinion than
to destabilize it.
It is impossible here to go into detail about the
ways in which public political opinion is formulated, so I shall limit myself to a few salient
points.98 First, voters are not blank slates at the
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beginning of a campaign. As Berelson, Lazarsfeld,
and McPhee recognized in a classic study conducted a half century ago, ‘‘[t]he individual’s vote
is the product of a number of social conditions or
influences: his socioeconomic and ethnic affiliations, his family tradition, his personal associations,
his attitudes on the issues of the day, his membership in formal organizations.’’99 As Zaller has
more recently put the point: ‘‘Every opinion is a
marriage of information and predisposition.’’100 A
voter’s decision to support a specific candidate or
policy, in other words, often represents the most
recent stage in a lengthy and complex ongoing process that long precedes the onset of the particular
election campaign providing the occasion for casting the vote in question. There is strong evidence,
for example, that voters learn much of what they
believe about politics in childhood and maintain
those beliefs throughout their lives.101
Second, the political beliefs people bring to
campaigns tend to be stable and self-reinforcing
during campaigns. Attempts to persuade voters
during election campaigns face extremely significant obstacles in the form of cognitive biases,
information-processing strategies, and social dynamics that together work with exceptional power to stabilize individual beliefs. For example, a selective
attention bias causes people to attend most carefully
to information with which they are already familiar
or with which they already agree, and to ignore
unfamiliar or challenging information.102 An interpretational bias tends to cause people to misinterpret new information that challenges their beliefs
in a way that renders the information more consistent with their existing beliefs than is actually the
case.103 Attitude-inconsistent information that the
voter actually manages to perceive and absorb is
both more likely to be actively resisted,104 and
less likely to be retained or to be accurately recalled
as inconsistent.105
A variety of social reinforcement effects also stabilize political opinion during election campaigns.
Even voters open to new information typically
have little choice but to look for it within the bounds
of their own social networks, where the information
available to be found is already biased by the environmental setting, thereby causing perpetuation of
any initial bias. The social environment, in other
words, ‘‘tends to reproduce the existing distribution
of opinion.’’106 Powerful social forces, moreover,
typically cause individuals to collaborate, so to

speak, in the construction of a social environment
in which they are less rather than more likely to
encounter political opinions that differ from their
own. For example, members of the same social
group tend to share political opinions, and members
of a social group have more contact with each other
than with members of other groups.107 Such contacts are therefore more likely to reinforce than to
challenge existing beliefs.
Finally, commonplace information processing
strategies tend to innoculate individuals against
ready alteration of their existing views. In today’s
society, the main problem voters face is not typically a dearth of relevant information but an overabundance of it,108 requiring even the most
responsible and dedicated of voters to develop coping strategies. One such strategy is the ‘‘on-line’’
model of information processing. According to
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this model, voters do not collect ‘‘raw’’ information
in a value-neutral form and keep it handy until some
point when they consider all the data at once to see
what conclusion on balance it supports. Instead, voters collect information bit by bit, evaluating each
new item as soon as they encounter it in what
amounts to a kind of ‘‘running tally’’ on the subject
in question.109 As a result, unless new information
is dramatically different from whatever the voter
has learned in the past, the voter’s political judgments are likely to be affected only marginally by
each new item, and his or her judgment will be
extremely stable over time.110
Although this strategy is cognitively efficient, it
gives opinions a kind of inertia or staying power
they might not have if voters made judgments by
weighing all the relevant data at once during the
campaign. As a result, any individual’s opinion
can in most cases be moved only slightly on the
basis of one or a few new pieces of information,
no matter how positive or negative. A really significant change in a voter’s evaluation of a party, a candidate, or a policy can in general result only from a
lengthy and highly consistent stream of information
that is inconsistent overall with the voter’s existing
provisional judgment, something very unlikely to
occur during the short period of an election campaign.
Another, closely related information-processing
strategy is the well-known Downsian strategy of
‘‘rational ignorance.’’ Because acquiring information sufficient to make an informed decision,
Downs argued, can be costly in both time and
money, a rational voter will make the investment
in electoral information only when the expected
benefits exceed the costs, which might be infrequent.111 Downs’s prediction appears to be borne
out by the evidence; certainly voters tend to be ignorant of electorally relevant facts.112
It is important to be clear here. The social science
literature does not say that people never change
their minds when confronted by political information and arguments. It does, however, make an
extremely powerful case that people almost never
change their beliefs and opinions to any significant
degree during campaigns.113 It tends to show
instead that in any given citizen’s life the engaged,
deliberatively reflective alteration of political opinion is unusual and infrequent, and that the norm is
for political opinion to form early, to evolve very
gradually, to be largely immune from significant,
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much less sudden and dramatic revision, and for
campaigns to have at best very little role in the formation of public political opinion, either at the individual or collective levels.
The formation of public political opinion
outside campaigns
The fact that public political opinion is unlikely
to be moved during campaigns does not by any
means imply that the political opinions of voters
are permanently fixed and incapable of change—
that we lack, in other words, a meaningful democratic politics. We have, it seems to me, a fairly
robust democratic politics, but it does not occur
mainly during campaigns. It occurs instead at
other times, indeed at all times and in all places
where citizens’ talk and behavior may have relevance for the formation of political opinions,
which is to say constantly, in the course of everyday
life.114 The main effect, then, of campaigns and
elections that stress mobilization over deliberation
and privilege majority opinion over minority
views, is not to destroy or to diminish democratic
politics, but rather to shift their locus from the
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tightly confined and comparatively well-regulated
realm of the electoral to the dauntingly wider and
far more unruly realm of the political.
The democratic politics in which public political
opinion is primarily forged occurs mainly in civil
society—not, or at least not especially or disproportionately, in the officially circumscribed electoral
arena itself.115 Citizens obviously do attend to and
absorb information and arguments that they will
later use to fashion the political opinions that will
guide their official electoral behavior, and they do
so frequently, perhaps even continuously. But the
venues in which they do so are to be found mainly
among the organizations, associations, and personal
relationships in which they move in their private,
‘‘nonelectoral’’ capacities,116 and as much at times
when they are not consciously thinking about politics as when they are.117
Here, then, is where the principles of deliberative
democracy may be most usefully deployed. The
problem of majoritarian bias is not confined to
elections and campaigns; it arises everywhere that
political opinion forms. The communicative environment outside the electoral arena is plagued by
worrisome inequalities and structural problems
that may have important ramifications for the way
democratic politics unfolds once it enters the more
circumscribed phase of the official campaign.
These inequalities and structural problems may
well entrench predictable biases in the production
of mass political opinion in the public sphere.
Consider, for example, inequality of access to
communicative resources. Communication—not
just for electoral purposes but for more broadly
political ones—costs money. The forms of mass
communication capable of reaching and influencing
the widest audiences, such as movies and television,
for example, are accessible only to the wealthiest
individuals and corporations. Video communication
may likewise be costly to produce and require technical expertise. Advertising in newspapers and magazines and conducting mass mailings are also
prohibitively expensive for all but a few. The Internet reduces the costs of distribution, but not of production,118 and is at present a haphazard method of
reaching an intended audience, except for those able
to pay for placement in targeted venues.
The high cost of communication coupled with the
inequitable distribution of communicative resources
means, of course, that information available in
the most readily accessible regions of the public

communicative sphere is likely to be biased in
favor of the views of the rich. Additionally, the
structure of media advertising revenue, which places a premium on the delivery of a mass audience
able to pay for products, creates structural incentives favoring the production of programming that
appeals to majorities rather than minorities.119 If
the political views and preferences of the rich and
the poor, or of majorities and minorities, tend in
the aggregate to differ on some issues, then the content of information and persuasive discourse generally available in the communicative sphere will be
biased in favor of the substantive positions of the
rich and of majorities on those topics.
Even among those who have the resources to
make use of mass media, inequality of actual access
to media can have a skewing effect on the content of
public political discourse. One of the more disturbing trends in the mass media sector is the increasing
concentration of ownership of media outlets. We
might expect, of course, that any particular media
outlet will exhibit some bias in favor of the views
of its owners, but this problem might be ameliorated
if ownership of media is widely dispersed.120 Yet
control of mass media is anything but dispersed:
today only five companies own most of the nation’s
newspapers, magazines, book publishers, motion
picture studios, and television and radio stations.121
Deliberative democracy’s concern that the views
of minorities be heard and evaluated on their merits
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has potentially great purchase here. First, measures
that might be infeasible to incorporate into the brief
and tightly controlled arena of formal campaigns
and elections might be much more feasible if
couched as reforms to the sprawling and almost
entirely unplanned sphere of daily politics. Efforts
to promote structural reforms or institutional innovations to make everyday political discourse more
egalitarian and to give greater voice to minorities
might, to be sure, face sharp challenges, but such
challenges would be the ordinary ones that confront any critical reform movement rather than
the distinctive challenges that would arise from
attempting to take on a specialized, tightly constructed legal regime deliberately designed to serve
contrary purposes.
Second, and more importantly, reforms guided
by theories of deliberative democracy would very
likely do more good in the sphere of nonelectoral
politics than in the realm of formal electoral institutions. As I suggested earlier, a principal goal of
deliberative democracy is to destabilize majority
opinion, and in so doing to make majorities more
open to minority views on their merits, increasing
the chance of their reception by the dominant
majority. For a variety of reasons detailed above,
this is an all but impossible task in the 60- or 90day period of a formal election campaign. And
although it is a difficult task to accomplish at any
time, in any setting, it is likely more feasible to
accomplish if conceived as the goal of a longterm, permanent reorientation of public political
opinion formation in the larger sphere of democratic politics.
More fundamentally, any progress favorable to
deliberative democracy that might be achieved in
the political sphere will necessarily manifest itself
in the electoral sphere. A majority that is rendered
more receptive to minority views in the formulation
of its political opinions will by definition take those
opinions into the electoral arena, where the extant
institutional regime will record and translate them
into electoral outcomes. The converse is less likely
to be true. Although political opinions and election
results are doubtless to some extent mutually constitutive, the goals of deliberative democracy would
surely be less secure in a system that attempts to
destabilize majority opinion during election campaigns but then remands it for long periods between
elections to a civil political sphere that tends to privilege and reinforce it.
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CONCLUSION
Deliberative democracy offers an exciting and
attractive conception of collective democratic life,
one well worth attending and aspiring to regardless
of whether its ideals ultimately are fully attainable.
The question I have raised here is a secondary one:
to what venues of political life ought we devote
efforts to realize deliberative democracy’s goals—
to create, in other words, an actual deliberative
democracy?
Electoral politics is of course modern democracy’s great, theatrical showplace, and might therefore seem logically to be the proper locus of the
greatest efforts at reform. I have argued here against
that conclusion. The extant regime of election law
is built around the reinforcement and privileging
of majority opinion, an institutional orientation
directly antithetical to the goals and methods of
deliberative democracy. The legal regime, moreover, is built that way for good reason: the periodic,
accurate recording of majority opinion is an indispensable function of any democratic regime, and
one that is by itself complex and difficult enough.
It ought not to be saddled with additional goals
derived from deliberative democracy such as
privileging the views of minorities or destabilizing
majority opinion. Elections ought not to be forums
for the destabilization of majority opinion, but for
its accurate identification and recording. Elections
and election law are therefore best understood as
institutional alternatives to democratic deliberation.
By the same token, attempts to shoehorn into the
electoral arena reforms guided by deliberative
democracy are likely to be ineffective. Election seasons are—and should be—brief. Ordinary and welldocumented characteristics of the way human
beings form political opinions raise numerous
obstacles to the deliberative destabilization of
majority opinion during the brief period allowed
to formal elections and their associated campaigns.
Conversely, because most of the action in political
opinion formation occurs outside the formal campaign, reforms aimed at airing minority views,
destabilizing majority ones, and promoting deliberative reformulation of collective political opinion
are far better addressed to the period between
elections—to the realm, that is to say, of ordinary,
daily politics. To the extent our ordinary politics
can be made fairer, more open-minded and respectful, and more deliberative, those benefits will be
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reaped in the arena of electoral politics to the same
extent as if it were so targeted. In sum, there appear
to be significant advantages to focusing reform
efforts on non-electoral politics, and no discernable
disadvantages.
Finally, in some ways, American law seems to
have made a choice. Its preferred strategy for protecting minorities is not primarily to structure electoral processes to be receptive to minority influence
so much as to convert minorities into local majorities by partitioning the public. Through institutions
such as federalism and bicameralism, American law
empowers minorities not by guaranteeing that their
voices be heard and attended to by majorities, but by
creating sub-domains in which minorities can
ignore one another while enjoying a kind of local
majority privilege. Within those domains, election
law serves as the vehicle for consolidating majoritarian power. Deliberative democracy thus takes

up a venerable American project, but pursues it in
domains of law that historically have been thought
to serve other purposes, by other means. Judged
against ideal theory, this approach may be inferior
to the forging of the grand, polity-wide consensus
to which deliberative democracy aspires, but it
may nevertheless be a workable, second-best solution that gives minorities some of what they want
without taking on long-established and apparently
deeply held conceptions of the legitimate power of
majorities.
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